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Abstract 
 
The Hungarian mixed-member electoral system, adopted in 1989, is one of the world’s 
most complicated electoral systems, and, as this paper demonstrates, it suffers from the 
“population paradox.” In particular, the governing coalition may lose as many as 8 seats 
either by getting more votes or by the opposition obtaining fewer votes on each 
territorial list. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The Hungarian electoral system has been extensively investigated by Benoit and 
Schiemann (2001), and by Benoit (2001), among others. This paper focuses on its 
apportionment of seats. Briefly, the 386 representatives get elected through 176 single-
member districts (SMDs). Proportional representation (PR) formulas determine the 
other 210 representatives from 20 territorial party lists (with a maximum of 152 seats) 
and a national party list (with at least 58 seats). Each territorial list as well as the 
national list has its own divisor for converting votes into seats.  
In PR systems the so-called population paradox emerges if a party with a faster voter 
growth rate loses one or more seats to a party with a slower voter growth rate. From 
Balinski and Young (2001) we know that, under certain technical conditions, only 
divisor methods, which allot seats by dividing the votes of each party by an 
appropriately chosen common divisor and then applying a specific rounding rule, avoid 
the population paradox. Therefore, the Hungarian two-level apportionment procedure, 
by employing 21 distinct divisors, allows for the population paradox. However, Balinski 
and Young’s theorem cannot be applied to the Hungarian two-ballot system, in which 
losing SMD votes on the national list are combined with correction votes coming from 
the 20 territorial lists. Tasnádi (2007) pointed out that the Hungarian apportionment 
procedure may suffer from the population paradox by showing that 10,000 additional 
votes for the largest governing party on the Budapest list can shift one seat from the 
largest governing party to the smallest opposition party. This paper investigates how 
many seats can be lost either by one party gaining votes or by its opponent losing votes 
on the territorial lists. This is of particular interest since, in the 2002 elections, the 
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governing coalition had just four representatives more than necessary to form a 
government. 
 
 
2 The population paradox 
 
The population paradox was first observed in the United States in 1900 when, based on 
Hamilton’s method, Maine could gain an additional seat at the expense of Virginia even 
though Virginia’s population was growing faster than Maine’s (Balinski and Young 
2001:43). More generally, the population paradox emerges if a state with a faster 
population growth rate loses one or more seats to a state with a slower population 
growth rate.2 In proportional representation systems, states and populations are 
analogous to parties and their votes, respectively. According to Balinski and Young 
(2001:117), only divisor methods avoid the population paradox. 
The population paradox occurs when there is a non-monotonic relationship between 
the number of votes and the seats obtained by the parties. However, in plurality voting 
systems — as in the United States and the United Kingdom — the losing party can 
obtain even more votes than the winning party. The same observation is also valid for 
mixed-member electoral systems and could apply to some elections in Hungary. 
However, this type of non-monotonic relationship, since it is a consequence of 
incorporating SMDs into an election system, is not the subject of this paper. The kind of 
non-monotonicity investigated here does not serve any objective of the designers of 
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electoral systems, for the most part, but is just an avoidable byproduct of mixing or 
modifying several sound apportionment methods. 
Before proceeding, the population paradox for multi-territorial and two-ballot 
systems needs to be defined. The entire territory is divided into territorial units using 
two (not necessarily different) methods: for example, the first division could determine 
the SMDs, and the second division could determine the units for the territorial party 
lists. However, other types of territorial divisions are allowed, so as not to exclude the 
electoral rule of the Welsh Assembly in which there are smaller territorial units for the 
first vote and larger territorial units for the second vote (see, for example, Altunbas and 
Chakravarty 2000). A multi-territorial two-ballot system is called population non-
monotonic if for each party, considering each territorial unit separately, either a ceteris 
paribus increase of its own votes or a ceteris paribus decrease of another party’s votes 
can lead to a loss of seats. Since in many multi-party systems there may be a 
competition of coalitions (government versus opposition), potential coalitions are 
evaluated jointly. This type of monotonicity could be referred to as coalition population 
monotonicity; however, the term “coalition” is omitted for the sake of brevity. A non-
population-monotonic electoral system exhibits the so-called population paradox.  
The population paradox has been documented for several mixed-member electoral 
systems, such as the electoral rule of the German Bundestag (see Fehndrich 1999) and 
the election of the Welsh Assembly (see Altunbas and Chakravarty 2000; Altunbas et 
al. 2002). While the German electoral rule was designed prior to Balinski and Young’s 
(2001) theory (first published in a comprehensive book in 1982), the designers of more 
recent mixed-member electoral rules should have been aware of these results, and 
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therefore should have been able to design electoral systems free of the population 
paradox. 
 
 
3 A hypothetical outcome of a Hungarian election 
 
Hungary is divided into 20 counties, each with a given number of territorial seats, and 
each county is divided into a given number of SMDs. Table 1 shows the seat 
distributions by county. Each voter has two votes: the first vote goes to a SMD 
candidate and the second vote to a territorial party list, where the SMDs are proper 
subsets of the territories. An assumption is that “split-ticket” voting does not occur (that 
is, each voter gives its SMD vote to that candidate who was nominated by the party 
chosen by its second vote), unless stated otherwise. Moreover, a national list was 
introduced to soften the winner-take-all effect in the SMDs by listing each party’s  non-
winning SMD candidates’ votes on the national list (for each party passing the 5% 
threshold). Since most of the territorial lists distribute only a small number of seats (up 
to 10 seats for 17 counties, see Table 1), a PR formula would leave small parties that 
pass the 5% threshold without a seat. Therefore, the national list is also used to 
compensate parties for the highly non-proportional outcomes on the territorial lists. The 
description of the compensation mechanism, which adds correction votes coming from 
the territorial lists to the votes coming from the SMDs, will be discussed later. 
The analysis starts with the political geography and party alignment of the 2006 
Hungarian election, and therefore describes the existence of two large parties, denoted 
by A and C, with nationwide support of at least 40% of the votes; and two other parties, 
Location of 
Table 1 
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B and D, passing the 5% threshold to qualify for seats from the territorial and national 
lists. Moreover, the governing coalition consisting of parties A and B seeks reelection, 
while parties C and D form the current opposition.  
Parties A and C each win an equal number (88) of SMDs, so the territorial and 
national lists will decide the final outcome. For the sake of simplicity, party A wins all 
the SMDs in Budapest, Baranya, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Csongrád, Heves, Jász-
Nagykun-Szolnok, Komárom-Esztergom, and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, while party C 
wins all the SMDs in Bács-Kiskun, Békés, Fejér, Győr-Moson-Sopron, Hajdú-Bihar, 
Nográd, Pest, Somogy, Tolna, Vas, Veszprém, and Zala. This latter assumption 
simplifies the calculation of votes won by parties on the national list, since then the 
votes of a party coming from the SMDs on the national list (in the case of no “split-
ticket” voting) can be calculated by adding the party’s second votes from those counties 
that the party lost. 
The presentation of the allotment procedure of the Hungarian electoral system is 
incorporated in the examples, showing the possibility of a severe population paradox 
effect. A candidate wins a SMD by receiving a majority of votes in the first round or, 
alternatively, by receiving a plurality of votes in the second round. In any case, the first-
round votes of those losing SMD candidates, whose party passes the 5% threshold, will 
be added to the appropriate parties’ votes on the national list. 
For example, the outcome of a territorial list based on the hypothetical results for 
county Pest is shown on the left hand side of Table 2. Pest can distribute a maximum of 
14 seats. According to the allocation procedure, the total number of votes has to be 
divided by the number of seats plus one. Referring to the second column of Table 2, a 
seat requires x = [608,500/(14+1)] = 40,566 votes, where [x] denotes the largest integer 
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not greater than x. The fourth column (quota) of Table 2 is calculated by dividing the 
number of votes of the respective party by 40,566. First, every party receives the largest 
whole number not greater than its quota, thus parties A, B, C, and D receive 
[233,000/40,566] = 5, [45,000/40,566] = 1, [273,500/40,566] = 6, and [37,000/40,566] 
= 0 seats, respectively. Second, according to the so-called “two-thirds limit” rule, the 
remaining seats can be allotted to parties with a fractional quota of at least two-thirds, 
following the procedure of largest remainders. If all seats of a territorial list cannot be 
allotted by this two-step procedure, then the remaining seats are added to the seats to be 
distributed on the national list. Turning back to Table 2, the first step already allotted 12 
seats, and thus, two additional seats may be allotted. The remainders of parties A, C, 
and D pass the two-thirds limit, but since party C has the smallest of these three 
remainders, it does not receive an additional seat. The final allotment can be seen in the 
sixth column of Table 2. Since parties A and D would require 6*40,566-233,000 = 
10,396 and 40,566-37,000 = 3,566 additional votes, respectively, to obtain their 
additional seats, these votes will be subtracted from their national list. In addition, party 
B’s votes of 45,000-40,566 = 4,434 and party C’s votes of 273,500-6*40,566 = 30,104 
did not qualify for a seat and, therefore, these votes must be added to those parties’ 
national lists. These values can be found in the fifth column of Table 2. 
One reason for the emergence of the population paradox is the application of the 
“largest remainder” procedure in allotting the remaining seats. To see this, assume that 
the ally of party C (party D) received 5,000 votes less, which would have resulted in the 
outcome shown on the right hand side of Table 2. The quotas of parties A, B, and C 
increase proportionally; however, considering the fractional parts, party C overtakes 
party A. The population paradox may be observed by comparing the left hand side of 
Location of 
Table 2 
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Table 2 with the right hand side: party A obtains fewer seats, while only party D’s votes 
decrease and the other parties’ votes remain fixed. The problem is even more serious 
because, on the Pest territorial list, the “informal alliance” of parties C and D gains a 
seat from the coalition of parties A and B, caused solely by party D obtaining 5,000 
fewer votes than before.  
As determined for county Pest, the national list is comprised, as already mentioned, 
of losing SMD votes and correction votes for all territorial lists. One might think that 
the transfer of seats in Pest would be reversed by the modified correction votes on the 
national list. Though this type of compensation through the national list is possible, it is 
not always the case: in 2006, on the national list almost 50,000 votes were needed to 
obtain a seat, while the same values for the territorial lists ranged from 22,000 to 
41,000. Thus, this type of compensation mechanism is imperfect. 
The emergence of a drastic population paradox effect is shown by shifting a seat 
from the government coalition to the opposition on each territorial list. This is done 
either by increasing the votes of a coalition party or by decreasing the votes of an 
opposition party. For example, starting from the outcome shown in Table 3, and 
emphasizing that the outcome of this hypothetical election assumes almost the same 
voter participation rate in each county as had been observed in the 2006 election, each 
county’s seats and number of correction votes can be determined in the same way as for 
county Pest (see also Table 2).3 
From Table 3, parties A, B, C, and D pass the 5% threshold; all 152 territorial seats 
have been allotted.4 The coalition of parties A and B obtains 22 territorial seats more 
than the opposition parties C and D. To determine the final outcome of the election, the 
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58 seats from the national list must be allotted. For simplicity, assume again that “split-
ticket” voting does not occur, and that the SMD candidates therefore obtain the same 
number of votes as the nominating party list in the same SMD. Since the assumption is 
that either party A or party C wins all SMDs in a county, the parties’ SMD losing votes 
can be determined simply by adding a party’s losing territorial list votes. By checking 
the territorial lists one can verify that the correction votes of parties A, B, C, and D are 
equal to -162,376, 127,610, 313,538 and 232,428, respectively. Table 4 contains the 
values needed for the allotment of the 58 national seats. According to the election 
system, these 58 seats must be distributed based on the aggregate of the lost SMD votes 
and territorial correction votes according to D’Hondt’s procedure, which is equivalent to 
Jefferson’s procedure.5 Thus, one can obtain the allotment on the left hand side of Table 
4 by employing, for instance, 53,000 as the common divisor. 
Adding the SMD, the territorial, and the national seats,  parties A, B, C, and D 
receive 185, 14, 175, and 12 seats, respectively. Thus, the coalition of parties A and B 
can form a government with a majority of 12 seats. 
The results of Table 3 in each county can be slightly modified either by increasing 
party A’s or party B’s votes, or by decreasing party C’s or party D’s votes. The 
respective changes in votes and seats can be found in parenthesis. According to the 
modified results determined by Table 3, parties A, B, C, and D pass the 5% threshold, 
and the coalition of parties A and B obtains 18 territorial seats less than the opposition 
comprised of parties C and D. Now, turning to the national list, the values at the right 
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hand side of Table 4 determine the allotment of the 58 national seats. Once again, the 
common divisor of 53,000 provides the allotment. 
Aggregating the SMD, the territorial, and the national allotments, parties A, B, C, 
and D receive 178, 14, 181, and 13 seats, respectively. Now the coalition of parties A 
and B loses the election by a difference of 2 seats. Summarizing the results, a transfer of 
seven seats is possible from parties A and B to parties C and D in this paradoxical way. 
The effect of the population paradox can even be enlarged to a transfer of 8 seats by 
a slight modification of the lost SMD votes on the national list, which requires “split-
ticket” voting. Assume that 25,500 voters, who voted for party D, vote for the SMD 
candidates of party C in SMDs won by party A. Thus, shift 25,500 votes on the national 
list from party D to party C. In addition, assume that 9,360 voters of party A vote for 
party B’s candidates in SMDs lost by party A’s candidates and that 18,720 voters of 
party B vote for party A’s candidates in SMDs won by party A’s candidates. This 
modification decreases the votes on the national lists of parties A and B by 9,360 each. 
Based on the territorial results of Table 3, the new allotment shown in Table 5 is 
calculated by applying the common divisor 52,500. 
Aggregating the results of Tables 3 and 5, the coalition comprised of parties A and B 
again wins the election by 12 seats. Now, combining the above-described “split-ticket” 
voting with the modified territorial results of Table 3, the allotment of the 58 seats of 
the national list is shown on the right hand side of Table 5. By comparing the right hand 
sides of Tables 4 and 5, there is a shift of an additional seat from the coalition of parties 
A and B to parties C and D, and the coalition of parties A and B loses the election by 4 
seats. Thus, it is possible to shift as many as 8 seats from one side to the other in this 
paradoxical way.  
Location of 
Table 5 
Attila Tasnádi 
 11 
4 The cause of the population paradox 
 
As noted, one reason for the emergence of the population paradox in the Hungarian 
electoral system is the application of the method of largest remainders in the so-called 
“two-thirds limit” rule. Without the territorial correction votes, the effect of the 
population paradox would be even larger, since a seat could be lost on each territorial 
list, thus transferring 20 seats in this paradoxical way. Hence, the national list dampens 
the effect of the population paradox but does not eliminate it. The compensation 
mechanism would be perfect if the “price” of a seat in votes were the same on each 
territorial list and on the national list. 
The paradox in Section 3 might seem like a purely constructed example, which 
would rarely occur in an actual election. However, the population paradox did in fact 
occur in the 2006 election. To verify this, the actual outcome of the 2006 election can be 
compared with the case in which the smallest governing party (SZDSZ) receives 4,000 
votes less in Győr-Moson-Sopron and 7,400 votes less in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, 
while the smallest opposition party (MDF) receives 1,200 votes more in Baranya and 
9,000 votes more in Somogy. This “slight” modification would transfer one seat from 
the largest opposition party (FIDESZ) to the largest governing party (MSZP) in this 
paradoxical way. Though this would not have altered the final outcome of the election, 
it points to the existence of the paradox in actual elections. 
So far, the issue of whether the first votes (i.e. the SMD votes) could contribute to 
the population paradox has not been explored. Clearly, a unilateral increase in first votes 
cannot lead to a paradoxical seat transfer if it does not change the winner of the SMD 
election. However, if the winner of a SMD changes by a unilateral increase in votes, 
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first votes can also contribute to the population paradox. A simple example can 
illustrate this, bearing in mind that redistricting has never occurred in the new 
Hungarian democracy, and therefore there were SMDs ranging from 30,000 to 67,000 
voters in 2006. As noted above, the price, in votes, of a seat on the national list in 2006 
was slightly less than 50,000. Suppose that there are several SMDs with 60,000 
participating voters, with just two candidates, and the candidates nominated by party A 
win by a margin of just a few votes over the candidates nominated by party C. Now if 
each of the party C candidates receives a few additional votes, turning around the 
outcome of its SMD, then it could happen that party C loses more seats on the national 
list than are gained by the newly won SMDs, since party C loses slightly less than 
30,000 votes on the national list, while party A gains slightly more than 30,000 votes on 
the national list. This situation did not occur in 2006, since only about 45,000 voters 
cast ballots in the largest SMD. Nonetheless, this type of paradox could occur in the 
future if no redistricting happens for many years, or if the participation rates become too 
heterogeneous. 
The first and the second votes both are subject to the population paradox. The lesson 
for electoral system designers is that in the case of national lists being used for 
dampening the outcomes in the SMDs, the ratio of SMD seats to the number of seats on 
the national list has to be chosen carefully, and redistricting has to be done regularly.6 
Moreover, it is well-established that the method of largest remainders should be avoided 
in any form, especially if PR formulas are used separately for each territorial list. 
There are many ways to avoid the population paradox even in mixed electoral 
systems. To meet the original objective of the designers of the Hungarian electoral 
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system (namely, to include SMDs, ensure smaller parties’ presence in Parliament by 
PR, compensate for the winner-take-all effect of SMDs, have small territories, and have 
territorial representation both in the SMD and PR branch), one suggestion, for instance, 
could be that the national list should only be used for the compensation of SMDs, and a 
bi-proportional allocation procedure could be used for the allocation of the 152 
territorial seats.7 
 
 
5 Concluding remarks  
 
The population paradox represents an important flaw in the Hungarian electoral system 
because a party’s additional voters or its opponents’ absent voters can lead to a loss in 
that party’s number of representatives in a territory, with the election results thus not 
reflecting the will of voters. To put it into a dynamic context, consider the following 
possible chronology of an election day: an hour before polls are closing, some voters 
think about staying away because of, say, good weather. In that case, with the 
population paradox, conscientious supporters can harm their preferred party, while an 
opponent can benefit from having lazier supporters. Clearly, this type of paradox is not 
desirable in an electoral system.  
In the Hungarian electoral system, it is possible to shift 8 seats from one side 
(coalition or opposition) to the other side in this paradoxical way. This is demonstrated 
using recent participation rates and party structure. Assuming a different party structure, 
with more parties passing the 5% threshold, it would be possible to increase the extent 
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of the population paradox, since this could lead to an increase in the number of SMDs 
losing votes and thus, in the relative difference between the value of a territorial vote on 
the territorial lists and on the national list. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Seat distributions by counties 
Counties SMDs Territorial seats 
Budapest 32 28 
Baranya 7 6 
Bács-Kiskun 10 8 
Békés 7 6 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 13 11 
Csongrád 7 6 
Fejér 7 6 
Győr-Moson-Sopron 7 6 
Hajdú-Bihar 9 8 
Heves 6 5 
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 8 6 
Komárom-Esztergom 5 5 
Nográd 4 4 
Pest 16 14 
Somogy 6 5 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 10 9 
Tolna 5 4 
Vas 5 4 
Veszprém 7 6 
Zala 5 5 
Sum 176 152 
 
 
Table 2. Results for county Pest 
 original results modified results 
Party votes % quota correction seats change 
in votes 
% quota Correc-
tion 
seats 
A 233,000 38.3 5.744 -10,396 6  38.6 5.791 31,835 5 
B 45,000 7.4 1.109 4,434 1  7.5 1.119 4,767 1 
C 273,500 44.9 6.742 30,104 6  45.3 6.798 -8,131 7 
D 37,000 6.1 0.912 -3,566 1 -5,000 5.3 0.795 -8,233 1 
Others 20,000 3.3 0.493    3.3 0.497   
 608,500 100.0 15.000  14  100.0 15.000  14 
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Table 3. Territorial lists 
 A B C D Others 
Counties votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats 
Budapest 460,000 
(+10,000) 
13 133,800 4 
(-1) 
356,000 10 61,300 1 
(+1) 
36,000 0 
Baranya 123,000 4 
(-1) 
8,000 
(+1,500) 
0 90,000 2 
(+1) 
8,000 0 1,500 0 
Bács-Kiskun 121,100 4 
(-1) 
8,000 0 154,000 4 
(+1) 
11,800 
(-3,800) 
0 2,000 0 
Békés 80,500 3 
(-1) 
7,000 0 110,500 3 
(+1) 
10,500 
(-1,500) 
0 2,000 0 
Borsod-A.-Z. 209,000 7 
(-1) 
9,000 
(+1,000) 
0 146,500 4 
(+1) 
9,000 0 1,000 0 
Csongrád 116,000 4 
(-1) 
9,000 
(+1,100) 
0 84,500 2 
(+1) 
9,000 0 1,000 0 
Fejér 80,500 3 
(-1) 
7,000 0 110,500 3 
(+1) 
10,500 
(-1,500) 
0 2,000 0 
Győr-M.-S. 94,600 3 
(-1) 
10,000 0 130,000 3 
(+1) 
12,600 
(-1,600) 
0 1,000 0 
Hajdú-Bihar 115,500 4 
(-1) 
9,000 0 146,900 4 
(+1) 
10,800 
(-800) 
0 1,000 0 
Heves 100,000 4 
(-1) 
6,500 
(+1,500) 
0 46,500 1 
(+1) 
5,500 0 1,000 0 
Jász-N.-Sz. 116,000 4 
(-1) 
9,000 
(+1,100) 
0 84,500 2 
(+1) 
9,000 0 1,000 0 
Komárom-E. 100,000 4 
(-1) 
6,500 
(+1,500) 
0 46,500 1 
(+1) 
5,500 0 1,000 0 
Nográd 37,600 2 
(-1) 
8,000 
(+2,000) 
0 40,000 2 16,000 0 
(+1) 
5,500 0 
Pest 233,000 6 
(-1) 
45,000 1 273,500 6 
(+1) 
37,000 
(-5,000) 
1 20,000 0 
Somogy 50,000 2 
(-1) 
7,000 0 107,100 3 
(+1) 
11,000 
(-5,000) 
0 1,000 0 
Szab.-Sz.-B. 136,000 5 
(-1) 
10,000 
(+2,000) 
0 120,000 4 20,000 0 
(+1) 
3,000 0 
Tolna 45,120 2 
(-1) 
9,600 
(+2,400) 
0 48,000 2 19,200 0 
(+1) 
6,600 0 
Vas 52,640 2 
(-1) 
11,200 
(2,210) 
0 56,000 2 22,400 0 
(+1) 
7,700 0 
Veszprém 78,800 3 
(-1) 
8,000 0 108,000 3 
(+1) 
9,500 
(-2,000) 
0 2,000 0 
Zala 60,000 2 18,700 1 
(-1) 
74,000 2 
(+1) 
10,500 
(-500) 
0 3,000 0 
Sum 2,409,360 
(+10,000) 
81 
(-18) 
340,300 
(+16,310) 
6 
(-2) 
2,333,000 63 
(+15) 
309,100 
(-21,700) 
2 
(+5) 
99,300 0 
 
Attila Tasnádi 
 18 
Table 4. National list 
 original results modified results 
Party SMD 
votes 
correction Sum % seats change 
in SMD 
correction sum % seats 
A 1,049,360 -162,376 886,984 27.9 16 0 388,413 1,437,773 45.3 27 
B 340,300 127,610 467,910 14.7 8 16,310 207,024 563,634 17.7 10 
C 974,500 313,538 1,288,038 40.4 24 0 -151,841 822,659 25.9 15 
D 309,100 232,428 541,528 17.0 10 -21,700 66,731 354,131 11.1 6 
Sum 2,673,260 511,200 3,184,460 100 58 -5,390 510,327 3,178,197 100 58 
 
 
Table 5. “Split-ticket” voting 
 original results modified results 
Party SMD 
votes 
correction sum % seats change 
in SMD 
correction sum % seats 
A 1,040,000 -162,376 877,624 27.7 16 0 388,413 1,428,413 45.2 26 
B 330,940 127,610 458,550 14.5 8 16,310 207,024 554,274 17.5 10 
C 1,000,000 313,538 1,313,538 41.5 25 0 -151,841 848,159 26.9 16 
D 283,600 232,428 516,028 16.3 9 -21,700 66,731 328,631 10.4 6 
Sum 2,654,540 511,200 3,165,740 100 58 -5,390 510,327 3,159,477 100 58 
 
